In our discussion on fundamentalism and communalism, we shall now address another type of manifestation of communalism. This communal attachment does not center directly on any religious belief or sentiment. Rather, for various reasons and objectives, individuals or political parties—without being connected to a given religious faith themselves—are seen to harbour both empathy and sympathy for and support the communal politics of a specific religion. Therefore, this is termed Reverse Communalism.[1] Political opportunism is intertwined with this, which is effectively a pseudonym for pseudo-secularism.
In our country, in particular, such tolerance and compromise toward Islamic fundamentalist organizations can be observed among leftist intellectuals and secular parties. We have seen how deeply pan-Islamic nationalism is embedded in Islamic fundamentalism; when the ethnic and nationalist aspirations merge with it, it becomes highly complex. Islamic political organizations had shrewdly exploited this. When the Muslim League put forward the demand for Pakistan in 1940, the then Communist Party of India (CPI) supported their demand, construing it as a struggle against British imperialism. They left the side of the Congress, who was leading then the anti-colonial movement, and directed their party workers to work within the Muslim League. Later, after witnessing the role of the Muslim League in communal riots, they made course correction.[2]
This mindset is reflected in the present conflict between the state of Israel and Hamas in Palestine. Despite Hamas being an Islamic fundamentalist political organization, we see a wave of indiscriminate sympathy and support for their views and methods across the globe. We have not seen a formal protest of that magnitude even regarding the way they attacked a festival on October 7, 2023, killing innocent Israeli citizens and taking them hostage. We see a picture of the moral dilemma regarding this in the comments of the renowned writer Arundhati Roy against the inhumane destruction that Israel is carrying out in Gaza in response to the Hamas attack.[3]
“I am acutely aware that being the writer that I am, the non-Muslim that I am and the woman that I am, it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible for me to survive very long under the rule of Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Iranian regime. But that is not the point here. The point is to educate ourselves about the history and the circumstances under which they came to exist. The point is that right now they are fighting against an ongoing genocide. The point is to ask ourselves whether a liberal, secular fighting force can go up against a genocidal war machine. Because, when all the powers of the world are against them, who do they have to turn to but God? I am aware that Hezbollah and the Iranian regime have vocal detractors in their own countries, some who also languish in jails or have faced far worse outcomes. I am aware that some of their actions—the killing of civilians and the taking of hostages on October 7 by Hamas—constitute war crimes. However, there cannot be an equivalence between this and what Israel and the United States are doing in Gaza, in the West Bank and now in Lebanon. The root of all the violence, including the violence of October 7, is Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and its subjugation of the Palestinian people. History did not begin on October 7, 2023.”
In independent India, despite making their political stance against Hindutva clear, declared secular parties have, from time to time, allied with the Hindutva centric organization RSS and its political wing. Even currently, despite not having a single-party majority the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) at the Centre could rule in an autocratic fashion and openly pursue their agenda of Hindutva, as they had no dearth of support and active cooperation of its coalition partners, many of whom once stood at the opposite pole of their communal politics and vouched for secularism. Similarly, in the past in the politics of votes and alliances, various anti-Hindutva secular parties, including the Left and Congress, have indulged Islamic fundamentalism. From time to time, they had meekly submitted or supported their fundamentalist demands, in the mask of secularism and commitment to communal harmony.[4] Their prime objectives were to win "electoral battles" and remain in power.
In this context, the analysis of the late renowned sociologist Dharma Kumar (1928-2001) regarding the perspective of India’s leftist intellectuals—specifically secular historians (whom we shall refer to as "progressives" in this discussion)—toward Hindutva and Islamic fundamentalism is noteworthy.[5]
According to her, several concepts or conclusions held by these historians regarding the nature of religious communalism in modern India are biased and lack historical evidences. On the contrary, it is more likely that objective evidences exist against them. However, these historians tend to avoid such facts and undermine the factors related to Islamic fundamentalism. As a result, there is a dearth of genuine research initiatives studying the social and communal lives of the Indian Middle Ages under Islamic rules. Let us briefly review some of these biased concepts and conclusions of these progressives as compiled by her.
Biased Historical Constructs
- Pre-colonial harmony: They hypothesise that before British rule, Hindus and Muslims lived in harmony in medieval society. It is argued that Western historians supporting the colonial rule, and Indian historians influenced by them, painted a false picture of communal conflict and tension in medieval Indian society—a picture now being used by current Hindutva proponents and historians of that ideology for communal politics.
- Communalism in India, a colonial construction: They believe that the seeds of communalism in its modern form were sown during the colonial era. In fact, it is claimed that colonial rulers deliberately planted these seeds and that communalism is essentially a “colonial construction”.
- The impact of modernity: The progressives consider that introduction of modernity in colonial era brought a massive shift in Hindu-Muslim relations because, for the first time, signs of conflict appeared in certain regions and among specific groups. This is attributed to various factors, such as the introduction of Western-style institutions and the rise of powerful socio-religious reform movements in Bengal, Punjab, and Maharashtra, which in turn triggered a revival of religious conservatism.
- Majority vs. minority communalism: They consider that the biggest danger facing India today is Hindu communalism. Therefore, it is deemed necessary for Hindus to be secular to help minorities become secular, as only the majority community can provide a sense of security. It is further believed that majority communalism (i.e., Hindu communalism in India) inevitably leads to fascism, while minority communalism (primarily Islamic communalism in India) leads to separatism or separatist sentiments.
Contradictions and Observations
While highlighting the popular and current concepts upon which the above observations were based, Dharma Kumar drew our attention to certain contradictions, which refute them. These observations are highly relevant in judging the origin and character of communalism in the Indian subcontinent.
- The Exit of Buddhism: Progressive historians usually have a biased narration on how Buddhism departed from the Indian subcontinent and Hinduism resurfaced with renewed vigour in Indian society. They view this return of Hinduism as a victory of social conservatism and reactionary forces. This is because, in popular conception, Buddhism is egalitarian, republican, and anti-caste / anti-Brahminical; thus, the fall of Buddhism is viewed as "bad". Hindutva writers also indirectly accept this, though they blame Muslims for the fall of Buddhism. Conversely, the left and secular camps argue that Brahmins destroyed Buddhism to maintain their vested interests. However, it is surprising that, despite this, process of transformation of a Buddhist majority populace to a Hindu majority, which covered a vast landscape of Indian subcontinent and spanned a long period of hundreds of years, there is no historical record of persistence violence and ruthless suppression targeting Buddhists by any Hindu royal power.[6]
Renowned historian D.D. Kosambi (1876-1947) proposed a different theory on this aspect.[7] He noted that in Buddhist statecraft, the universal rule of a Chakravartin king (like the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka) is considered the ideal. He argued that when post-Harsha India broke into smaller kingdoms and the system of local rule of feudal lords was established, it was no longer economically feasible for those small states to maintain large, expensive Buddhist monasteries and their numerous monks. In comparison, establishing religious order through Hindu temples and a smaller number of Brahmin priests was easier.
Another flaw in these theories is the neglect of the specific process through which Hinduism assimilated Buddhism. Furthermore, Buddhism’s influence brought many changes to Hinduism itself. Through a kind of synthesis, the Buddhism of the 9th and 10th centuries merged into the larger Hindu family—a fact that has not received sufficient attention from our historians.[8]
· Two faces of Hinduism: Progressive historians distinguish between “Brahmanical Hinduism” and “Lokaayata (Folk / Popular) Hinduism”. In their view, Brahmanical Hinduism is essentially the “bad” Hinduism, which is distinct from the common folk’s “good” Hinduism or “true Hinduism”.
The root of this argument lies in the customs of caste division and untouchability within Hindu society. However, focusing solely on the caste system to entirely vilify Brahmanical philosophy results in a one-sided judgment. This perspective tends to ignore the internal reforms and changes in ancient customs within Hinduism to adapt to modernity. It cannot be denied that devout Hindus, including Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi, long attacked untouchability on moral grounds, and this has gained theoretical acceptance across a large section of Hindu society. Even earlier in our discussion, we saw that Hindutva proponents have theoretically rejected casteism, although they do not reject Varnashrama, as they consider it to be a system of division of labour introduced in ancient Vedic society with much more mobility among social segments.[9]
Currently, another form of opportunistic caste-based politics is being played against Brahmanism. Leftists, too, have taken refuge in this opportunism. This is yet another example of reverse communalism. Consequently, in the momentum of political opportunism, a coalition between the so-called Brahmanical Hindutva proponents and various political parties representing Dalit and Kurmi castes has become possible today.[10]
· The majority against a minority: A common strategy of the progressives is to refer to Hindus merely as a “majority community”. In this way, communalism is reduced to a simple generalization of conflicts between "majority" and "minority" communities. They even include Buddhism and Jainism under the "minority" umbrella to reduce the size of the Hindu "majority" as much as possible. But the problem with this hodgepodge of division is placing the religions of the Indian subcontinent in the same "minority" basket as Abrahamic religions. As discussed earlier, these two categories of religions are characteristically quite different. One is very much dominant / hegemonic, while the other is pluralistic. Thus, they overlook the difference in the communal character of these two lineages.
· Harmonious courtly life: There is a lack of historical documents and evidence regarding the daily lives of common people under various Muslim rulers. Drawing a conclusion of a harmonious atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis across the entire country from this limited data is an oversimplification. The writings of progressives often mention only the courtly life of these rulers—specifically, North Indian courtly life. It is true that under some rulers, a type of courtly culture developed in art, architecture, music, and literature through the synthesis of Hindu, Persian, and Saracenic styles. It is also true that under some rulers, many educated individuals who once studied Sanskrit began learning Persian instead. This brought a certain pan-Indian character to the life of the North Indian urban high society. However, this never spread across the whole of India; it was a very small portion of North Indian life.
Undoubtedly, this North Indian courtly culture can be accurately described as a composite culture, and its achievements in Indian architecture and music are glorious. But one cannot claim, simply by looking at the beauty of the Taj Mahal, that conflict between Muslims and Hindus was absent during its construction. These accounts offer no specific commentary on the pride of Islamic rule among Muslims, or the suppressed fear and distrust among Hindus. However, a glimpse of the distrust born of religious bias and fear of authority can be seen in the behaviour of Hindus after the end of Muslim rule. As one colonial-era historian remarked: "It is rarely acknowledged how much Hindu festivity came out into the open during the 19th century." [11] His comment hints at a potential communal tension. Delving into it may be painful, but however unpleasant the truth is, it needs to be understood in its true perspective.
· Undermining Islamic theory of Jihad: Regarding how Islam spread in India, the progressives tend to favour a specific narrative. They do not give weight to the Islamic theory of Jihad. On the other hand, Hindutva proponents claim that Islam spread in this subcontinent through force. Rather than directly rejecting this claim, progressives seek to present the violent expansion of any religion as a natural medieval or ancient process. Consequently, secular and various schools of Muslim historians responded by claiming that Hindus themselves were violent toward Buddhists. For instance, during a 1961 debate over school textbooks in Uttar Pradesh between Chief Minister Sampurnanand and A. J. Faridi, Faridi claimed that he had no objection to the narrative, and also to teaching in school history books about the destruction of Hindu temples by Muslim conquerors, provided the lessons would include how Hindu rulers destroyed Buddhist temples.[12] Along with this, some secularists hold the view that the flaws of Hinduism—specifically the inhumane treatment of lower castes by the upper castes—inspired a large number of the poor to embrace Islam.
Analytical and research-oriented studies on the spread of Islam in the Indian subcontinent are still insufficient. Among them, Richard M. Eaton, a Professor of History at the University of Arizona, published a highly informative research work on the spread of Islam in Bengal.[13] In it, he examined four prevalent theories of Islamization in India and attempted to outline the potential causes of Islamization. Let us briefly go through his findings and arguments.
The first, and the least credible theory is that Islam came through immigrant Muslims—meaning Islamization did not occur through the conversion of local inhabitants, but rather that Indian Muslims are descendants of immigrants from abroad. This naturally fails to explain the vast number of local people who embraced Islam.
The second theory characterizes Islam as a ‘Religion of the Sword’, suggesting that residents of the subcontinent were forced to embrace Islam under the threat of violence. However, the contradiction in this theory becomes apparent when one observes that the proportion of Muslims to Hindus in North Indian states is not sufficiently high, despite those regions being ruled for centuries by powerful Muslim rulers. Conversely, Islam spread most rapidly and in vast numbers in the frontier regions of East Bengal and West Punjab, where Islamic rule was relatively soft and accommodative to local customs.
According to the third theory, Islam spread in the subcontinent as a ‘Religion of Patronage’. This suggests that residents converted out of a desire for favours such as money, property, or power from Muslim rulers. But this could only satisfy a handful, and it does not explain the extensive Islamization of Bengal and Punjab given the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in those regions at the time.
The fourth is the theory supported by our "progressives": Islam as a religion of “social liberation”. Yet, strong factual evidences for this have not been presented by them, at least regarding Bengal. Eaton has shown that "in Bengal, Muslim converts came primarily from indigenous groups who were only marginally acquainted with Brahmanical culture, and the same was true for various Jat groups in Punjab who eventually formed a large part of the Muslim community."[14]
However, the process of Islamization in this subcontinent cannot be limited to these four theories. Since the details of this process are more available for Bengal than other regions, Eaton presents a possible scenario based on those accounts. Citing evidence, Eaton shows that the mass Islamization of Bengali peasants only happened after the sixteenth century. This occurred during the Mughal era. Yet, the Mughals had no specific interest in proselytization. It happened through a slow process over centuries, beginning with the expansion of agriculture and the establishment of new settlements by clearing forests on the eastern frontier. Religious institutions played a crucial role in this colonization, and mosques and shrines (mazars) spread throughout the countryside of East Bengal. Due to the inherent tolerance of the local populace, they initially accepted Allah, Muhammad, and Muslim holy men as additions in the list of to their worshipped deities and saints.
Eaton calls this first stage ‘Inclusion’. In the subsequent stage, these "identities" ‘merged’. Thus, 'Allah' was used synonymously with 'Niranjan.' In the final stage, ‘Displacement’ occurs, where Muslim rituals and codes displace others. While it is difficult to determine clear chronological divisions of these stages, the form of "Islam" present in modern Bengal—as a conservative, closed system defined by the Quran and Hadith—is primarily a product of the "purification" movements of the religious fundamentalist in nineteenth[15] and twentieth centuries.[16] Yet, for the rural Bengalis of the pre-modern era, the line of distinction between 'Islamic' and 'Hindu-Buddhist' customs was blurred and flexible.[17]
· Colonial communalism: We have already discussed the role the colonial British government played in the introduction of religious communalism into Indian nationalist politics.[18] However, while identifying the British era as the source of religious communalism, an important fact escapes our notice: it was the British who first adopted the policy of separating religion from the state in India.[19] Individual government officials might have assisted missionary activities, but it was not legal. On the contrary, the law was not to support any religion, and this was seen during the colonial era through the reduction of government subsidies for religious institutions and officials. Therefore, highlighting only the divisive role of colonial rulers in communal politics while obscuring its character of upholding secular principles applied universally in the administration is a form of bias.
Conversely, to prove the religious tolerance of the Mughal era, progressives often ignore the bias toward Islam and discriminatory behaviour toward non-Muslim populations during that period. One example is the imposition of the Jizya tax on non-Muslims. In this case, the indulgent argument of the progressives is that not all Mughal emperors imposed Jizya, and that special taxes on Hindus or the looting of temples were ‘motivated solely by a desire for revenue’.[20] We have also seen in the history of Sikhism, how Sikhs were persecuted by Mughals.[21]
· Religious tolerance of rulers: Regarding the relationship between religion and the state, there is a difference in the political philosophies of medieval Hindu and Muslim rulers. Islamic texts clearly state that the function of the state is “to protect the religion of Islam and propagate its message”.[22] Although a Hindu king might consider other religions or sects inferior to his own, it can be said of Hindus that “the king was tasked with protecting all religions within his kingdom”. [23] The pace of conversion also depends on the state policy. Hindu and Muslim rulers had different policies toward subjects outside the ‘state’ religion. In this context, historian Aziz Ahmed remarks that, generally, with some exceptions like Firoz Tughlaq, Muslim rulers did not provide state encouragement or use force for non-Muslims to embrace Islam. However, all Muslim rulers were extremely strict in punishing apostasy (quitting the religion). Only Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin of Kashmir and the Mughal Emperor Akbar were perhaps the two rulers who accepted equal rights for both Hindus and Muslims regarding conversion and apostasy. On the other hand, the attitude of Hindu rulers toward conversion and re-conversion was entirely different.[24]
...
Dharma Kumar's sharp observations show how even the progressives get entangled in the trap of "reverse communalism" within a labyrinth of evidence-free arguments. This lack of an objective perspective among our leftist and secular historians in knowing and understanding medieval Indian social life, and their tendency to avoid or downplay natural questions arising from the differences between Islam and Indian religions in their urge to refute Hindutva politics, actually add more confusion in the mind of an impartial and rational person. Their explanation is also inconsistent with the folk-cultural narratives of Hindu-Muslim harmony and conflicts in Middle Ages. Thus, their credibility is at risk. Communal organizations of both Hindu and Muslim faiths are taking advantage of these confusions today. This is why it has become increasingly necessary to know, understand, and bring to light our history of social interaction among these religions with facts and accounts. These would help us to judge the past, study the present scenario, and take our stand against the revival of religious fundamentalism and communalism in the modern world.
(Translated from a Bengali article written by the author with the help of Google Gemini.)
10/4/26
[1] Another type of communal expression is seen among intellectuals. Despite professing sympathy for secularism, atheism, etc., they are biased towards the religion of their own family and community. Depending on the situation, it may also assume a strong communal character. We identify this type of communalism as ‘latent communalism’. It is at the opposite pole of the reverse communalism. (Author)
[2] Irfan Habib, The Left and the National Movement : Social Scientist , May - Jun., 1998, Vol. 26, No. 5/6 (May - Jun., 1998), pp. 3-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517546
[3] Arundhati Roy: ‘No propaganda on Earth can hide the wound that is Palestine’, Canadian Dimension on October 13, 2024.
https://mronline.org/2024/10/19/arundhati-roy-no-propaganda-on-earth-can-hide-the-wound-that-is-palestine/ , Posted Oct 19, 2024.
[4] Aditya Mukherjee, How Secular Parties Played Their Part in Rise of Communalism, 25th Feb, 2023, https://thewire.in/books/how-secular-parties-played-their-part-in-rise-of-communalism
[5] Dharma Kumar, Left Secularists and Communalism, Economic and Political Weekly, Jul. 9, 1994, Vol. 29, No. 28, pp. 1803-1809.
[6] On the other hand, extensive accounts of the destruction of Buddhist monasteries and temples during the Turkish invasion of Bengal and Bihar (then Magadha) in the 12th century are available from the writings of Muslim historians and Tibetan Buddhist monks. For example, the account of the destruction of Nalanda and Odantapuri Mahaviharas during the invasion of Bakhtiyar Khilji is available in the writings of the 13th century historian Minhajuddin Siraji in his Tabaqat-i-Nasiri. Similarly, the autobiographical writings of the contemporary Tibetan monk Dharmaswamin provide accounts of the destruction of Buddhist monasteries and temples by the Turkish invaders, and the torture and killing of Buddhist monks. In the atmosphere of fear of the Turkish invasion, many Buddhist scholars and monks fled to Nepal and Tibet at that time. It is mentioned in the writing of Dharmaswamin that even after this, Buddhist scholars in Nalanda resumed their studies and intellectual practices to a limited extent. They were newly united with the financial support of a Brahmin named Jayadeva from a wealthy commoner family. For this reason, Jayadeva was arrested by the Turkish soldiers and threatened with death. A local Hindu king also supported the resumption of Buddhist Viharas. This account by Dharmaswamin also rejects the theory of the conflicts between Hinduism and Buddhism as the reason for the extinction of Buddhism in East and North India. -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nalanda_mahavihara#cite_note-109
[7] D D Kosambi, 'The Decline of Buddhism in India' (1956) in Exasperating Essays, India Book Exchange, Calcutta, 1957; re- printed 1977.
[8] The play 'Agamdambar' written by Jayanta Bhatta, a Kashmiri Naiyayaka, in the 9th century, presents the controversies of contemporary Buddhism, Jainism, Tantra, and Vedic religions. The playwright, of course, presents these controversies to prove the superiority of Vedic religion and tries to show the arguments of different religions in a somewhat ironic way. But in the last chapter of the play, he ends the play with a plea for friendly coexistence and reconciliation of all these religions. This play shows the opposite picture of the theory of the extinction of Buddhism through violence. - 'Much Ado About Religion' A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Agamadambara, a Satirical Play by the ninth century Kashmiri philosopher Bhatta Jayanta - D.Phil, thesis, by Csaba Dezso, Balliol College, 15 January 2004.
[9] However, the futility of this claim in favour of Varnashrama is found in ancient Hindu scriptures. In a hymn of the Rigveda, a reference to Varnashrama clarifies varying social status among high and low castes by comparing them with different parts of a human body. There are also references in scriptures of being born into a high caste through good work (Karma).
[10] After the 2024 elections, the BJP formed a government at the Centre with the support of Nitish Kumar's JD(U) (representing the Kurmi community) and Chirag Paswan's LJP (son of late Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan). Without their support, the Hindutva-aligned BJP could not have formed the government.
[11] Asim Roy, Islamic Syncretist Tradition, 1937, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1983 p 25.
[12] Paul Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1974, p 222.
[13] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993.
[14] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, P-115.
[15] In the 1830s and 40s, the Faraizi Movement emerged under Shariatullah (and later Dudu Miyan), preaching against Islamic rituals influenced by local Hindu traditions and advocating for Islam as described in the Quran and Hadith. This movement became popular among Muslim peasants as it rose against the taxes and oppression of the British and Hindu landlords. A similar movement arose in Barasat in 1830-31 under Titu Mir. While Titu Mir's followers were suppressed, the Faraizis eventually accepted British rule and were tolerated. These movements consolidated the communal identity of Bengali Muslims, creating a distinction from Bengali Hindus. — Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-religious reform movements in British India, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[16] The situation in post-July 2024 Bangladesh—where Baul, Sufi, and Marfati Muslims are being attacked during "Islamic purification" riots by the "Tauhidi" public with active state backing—is being viewed as a new stage of Islamization. While Islam spread in Bengal via Sufism prior to the 19th century, followed by the rise of Hanafis, the current stage sees the more conservative Salafism taking root. (Author)
[17] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. P.173.
[19] The British government was always conscious of maintaining this secular policy in the colonial education system, as formulated by Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839). - https://jmukhopadhyay.blogspot.com/2024/07/the-colonial-education-in-india.html
[20] Satish Chandra, Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1993.
[22] P J Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Paperback edition, Routledge, London, 1991.
[23] Heinrich von Stietencron, 'Hinduism, On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Noun" in Gunther D Sontheimer and Herman Kulke (eds), Hinduism Reconsidered, Manohar, Delhi, 1989, pp. 19-20.
[24] Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, pp 85-86.
