Monday, 13 April 2026

Religion and Modernity: Part VII (the cocluding part) - The Way Forward

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of socialist ideology worldwide, religious revivalism became stronger, and religious fundamentalist organizations in various countries became stakeholders in political power. Conversely, on an international scale, public support for free market oriented capitalist systems has grown at the expense of social-welfare centric state ideologies.  Consequently, even the states in the West with a varying degree of commitment to  public welfare have altered their character. Social sectors such as health, education, power generation, defence, banking, and other essential services are being privatized.  This has allowed monopoly capitalism to develop and consolidate further.  In various countries, a section of domestic capitalists gradually operated in the interests of this international monopoly capital, and have been building  partnerships with them to have a finger in every pie. Day by day they are becoming influential in their national politics. Never-the-less, the capitalism by its nature, intensifies the social crisis and gets trapped into a state of chaotic recession. A vast portion of society's wealth and income remains confined to a tiny minority. In this environment of extreme wealth inequality and in reaction to the looting of national resources by a handful few, public resentment continues to grow. To curb this public anger, these stinkingly rich and powerful sections among capitalists provide support to right-wing religious communal politics. As a result, we are witnessing the empowerment of religious fascist and ultra-nationalist parties throughout the world, including in this Indian subcontinent.

Given this situation, what next? What position should an ordinary, rational, secular person take in engaging ourselves individually, as well as  socially? Specifically, what will happen to us  “Bengalis”? Today, the essence of "Bengaliness" is not only attacked by Hindutva proponents in our country; in our neighboring Bangladesh, the sword of Islamic hegemonism is also poised to erase a centuries-old, religiously tolerant, liberal, and humanistic cultural identity of this land enriched by the likes of Chandidas[1], Chaitanya[2], Lalon[3], Rabindranath[4], and Nazrul[5]. We must seek answers to these questions in the light of modernity and guide our social and political movements accordingly. However, I want to clarify here that I am not a proponent of Bengali nationalism. Rather, I am a follower of the dream of Indian unity through the harmony of all languages and cultures of multi-ethnic India, as envisioned by our great thinkers, including Rabindranath Tagore. Therefore, we must seek this way forward together. All sensitive and rational people of India need to unite and organize against religious communalism, unscientific propaganda, and blind faith at this critical moment of crisis. The religious issues can no longer be ignored in the social and political movements arising from today's economic crisis and the various undemocratic and anti-people policies of the rulers.

There was a time, when the leaders and activists of the left-wing movement thought that it was possible to counter religious beliefs and divisions primarily through democratic and socialist movements. It is also true that in such movements, a large section of the working class and intellectuals did abandon their religious practices and beliefs. But this process is not one-sided. When the social and political movements  retreated and, the leftist leadership formed alliances with religious communal parties in their opportunistic politics, many of these individuals drifted back into the politics of their respective religious communities. Therefore, fundamentalism and communalism can easily influence these movements today. We must be aware of this and participate in these movements and take a clear stand against the fundamentalist and communal forces. Floating along with the tide of popular resentment on religious sentiment is no longer an option.

Furthermore, there are movements where fundamentalist organizations raise their voices and protest against alleged interference in religious matters. In such cases, secular right-wing and left-wing opposition parties often join their chorus in the name of opposing the government. Even when the government introduces administrative reforms consistent with modernity to eliminate religious discrimination, these secular parties join hands with fundamentalist organizations in opposition. They do not want to miss this opportunity for grabbing a low hanging fruit of turning the opinion of a community in their favour and thus get engaged in creating a hulla bolla against the government in the name of secularism and religious freedom. Eventually, they become entangled in the web of fundamentalist-communal forces and deplete their own strength.

In fact, in the past whenever secular forces formed tactical alliances with fundamentalist forces to participate in mass movements, those little "ants"  had reaped the benefits. These ants later spread their wings like predatory birds. Their ground would get firmer, and their organizational network spread easily. Whether it was the Communists' alliance with the Muslim League over the demand for Pakistan against the British, or the unification of other secular parties with the Hindutva-aligned Jana Sangh to end the autocratic Congress rule in 1977 parliamentary election; countless such examples exist not only in our country but also in the pages of history across the world. After the mass movement to overthrow Awami League's authoritarian rule in Bangladesh in July 2024, the fundamentalists, who also took part, have gradually become stronger, and the secular forces remain sidelined. There, the secular leaders did not take any firm stand against the fundamentalist forces within the new political party called the National Citizen Party (NCP) that the students who led the anti-discrimination movement had formed. Subsequently, the fundamentalist forces gained more strength, and the secular camps weakened. Truly, building a movement against religious fundamentalism and communalism is a long-term, persistent process. Even a temporary compromise with those forces may alter the very character of an organization.

Finally, as a secular and rational citizen, I wish to present, through a series of questions and answers,  my thoughts, framed within the context of modernity regarding what we expect and what our role to be in a democratic and secular state.

 


(1) Is it merely Theism vs. Atheism?

In today's secular world, many reduce the opposition to a religion to a simplistic denial of God's existence. Intellectual proselytizers consciously employ the strategy of hiding the untruthful explanations and beliefs of their religious fantasies in their infallible scriptures behind complex theological debates about existence of a ‘theoretical’ God. However, on the assumption of their infallibility, they never admit that the descriptions and accounts of the so-called God in their scriptures had been proven false in various ways by modern science. While the possibility of an "atheistic" world cannot be denied, even if one accepts the existence of a theistic world, that world would require a "new" God. In the context of today's modern knowledge, honest believers[6] need to change their 'concept of God' and their interpretation of the 'creation' of the organic and inorganic world. How they do it is their matter! But, the simple truth that, the descriptions in their scriptures no longer stand up to logic and argument, should now be accepted.


(2) How useful is religious reform in this era?

The history of religious reforms has shown that they have never been able to eradicate various inequalities arising from the beliefs and practices of that religion, e.g. the socio-economic-gender discrimination. They have come back again with some cosmetic changes to perpetuate the inequalities of contemporary society. Yet, there is a high chance that someday  radical return of fundamentalist forces again may drive away all those progressive reforms as a pretext for social and economic crisis. We also notice that traders of various religions have also spread their nets all over the world in the name of ‘religious reforms’. Their opposition to modern knowledge and science and gender inequality is also quite evident. That is why the attempt to make traditional religions compatible with modernity through ‘reforms’ is futile.


(3) Does communalism have a "color"?

In instances of communalism or violence against other faiths, we often hear that "one should not differentiate between the colors (i.e., religions) of communal forces"; that is, one should not discriminate between religions because every religion has both communal and non-communal people, and thus all communal forces must be opposed in the same way. We frequently hear this rhetoric from our so-called secular leaders and friends. In reality, for the last three decades, Islamic militant organizations have been carrying out attacks one after another in many countries, including India. The state support of a few Islamic nations behind them is as clear as daylight. It is difficult to ignore this simple reality. If we ignore it, the communal forces of the affected community also pitch their voices and make their ground stronger. Unless one distinguishes the religious beliefs of communal ideologies, and takes a clear stand against them, the hands of communal forces in both religions are strengthened.

In this discussion, we have seen that the character of communalism varies among different religions. Hegemonic religions are many times more aggressive toward other communities. In this context, it is essential to give special importance to tackling Islamic fundamentalist and communal organizations in the current world, including our own country. We must analyze why they are expanding their influence. The unprincipled path taken by Western countries, including the USA, in supporting Pakistani rulers to spread fundamentalist education and organizations to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan has left the entire world, including this subcontinent, suffering from its poisonous fruits.[7] Trapped in the labyrinth of secularism and driven by the unprincipled urge to cross electoral hurdles, both right and left-wing governments in our country have indulged, rather than hindered, the spread of fundamentalist education in Qawmi Madrasas. Therefore, a religion that, by its very nature, is capable of rapidly spreading communal influence among ordinary believers and inciting violence[8] must not be placed on the same footing as others when addressing communalism.


(4) How appropriate is it for people of one religion to criticize another?

It is generally considered a matter of civility in a civilized society and consistent with the principle of religious tolerance to refrain from making adverse comments about the customs and beliefs of those belonging to different faiths. However, many proselytizers do not follow this. Those who wish to bring people of other faiths under their own umbrella consider such criticism even more necessary. Yet, they are the ones who become incensed and allege "hurting religious sentiments" when their own religious practices are criticized.

I have seen many of my left-leaning Hindu friends harbour the notion that the responsibility for removing religious bigotry and superstition from Muslim society rests solely upon the progressives within that community. They suggest "Hindu" progressives should instead speak out against their own casteism, gender discrimination, and religious superstitions. The "opportunistic" side of this attitude is that it easily ignores the problem of Islamic communalism while granting a license to focus solely on majority (i.e., Hindutva) communalism. This avoids the fear of losing Muslim votes in the electoral arena while securing the support of general intellectuals under the label of "progressiveness." For years, this political opportunism has strengthened the position of "Hindutva" forces in our country.

This same attitude has increased the distance between ordinary Hindus and Muslims in India including in  Bengal. An ordinary Hindu in Bengal knows very little about Islamic ethics and religion, especially when it is very different from our native culture. He does not even have the idea of ​​how the Islam of the Middle East is different in terms of the synthesis of the local culture. To him, the men and women wearing beards and caps, hijabs and burqas are all the same kind of devout Muslims. He does not find any kinship between them and the liberal and humane culture of Bengalis. Therefore, people of both religions need to mix with more open minds[9], and at the same time, there is a need to discuss and criticize both religions in terms of good and bad.


(5) When does the boundary of religious sentiments cross?

Whenever any criticism is levelled against a religion, religious gatekeepers and their lackeys frequently raise the allegation of hurting religious sentiments. In many Islamic countries, even minor criticism can put the critic’s life at risk. Often, religious leaders there incite a frenzied, bigoted mob, bringing disaster upon the property, honour, and lives of those unfortunate individuals of other faiths. The administration, under the guise of maintaining law and order, often indulges such incidents. There is no fixed definition for this "boundary of religious sentiment"; it is defined by religious leaders and traders of religion according to their own convenience. Currently, the wind is blowing in favour of these religious gatekeepers. They are no longer willing to tolerate even the slightest criticism of their religious conduct even if supported by science and modern epistemology. And if they smell any indirect criticism in the field of culture, poetry, literature, songs, films and plays, then they immediately take to the field with swords in hand. Before the decade long rule of Hindu nationalists in our country, orthodox Hindus did not raise any dissenting voice about this kind of violation. But now they are as vigilant as their Islamic counterparts.


(6) Is religion indispensable to social life?

It is undeniable that in pre-modern societies, various religions brought socio-economic stability and played an important role in the development of human civilization. However, their worldview and societal outlooks did not evolve at the same pace with the modernity as reflected by the advancement of human knowledge and civilization; rather they became tools for maintaining social inequality by religious traders and business organizations. For this reason, religious rituals and practices deserve no special importance in the daily affairs of the real, secular world. Nevertheless, religious philosophy, literature, music, drama, and dance are integral parts of our culture. In those spheres, religious study certainly holds a distinct significance. We must acknowledge this in our social interactions, work, and ceremonies, judging it with an open mind and within its historical context. We should continue this practice in a manner where all religions coexist with equal dignity and remain consistent with modernity.


(7) Should religious subjects be included in modern educational curricula?

A kind of ‘prohibition’ with a feeling of ‘untouchability’ exists regarding religious education in the modern education system. In order to keep education secular, the subjects of religious books are kept out of the curriculum. We only see general moral codes consistent with modernity and hagiographic accounts of religious leaders and characters finding a place in language studies. Analytical discussion and criticism of the subjects of religious books are absent from the curriculum. Consequently, even the educated mind becomes influenced and overwhelmed by the "mysterious glory" of scriptures as certified by religious preachers.  However, if the description and explanation of religious books are also taught along with the subjects of modern knowledge and science, people would become more aware of their myths, morality, relevance, and suitability for the modern age. Therefore, the subject matter of religious scriptures needs to be included in our curriculum in more detail, with authentic analysis and critique. And in this religious education, the subjects of the main religious books of all religions should be taught in the light of modern logic and argument. Along with this, it is necessary to change the system of imparting religious education from childhood onwards. It is inappropriate to provide this type of religious education without teaching modern scientific subjects. Both lines of reasoning—logical and theological—must be placed before the students, by choosing topics fitting to  their appropriate age of maturity.


(8) Are religious festivals against modernity?

Many festivals are celebrated in harmony with modern life, centered on religious beliefs. Many of these festivals become festivals for all people regardless of religion or community. On the other hand, there are some festivals that are limited to the participation of only believers of one religion and community. When religious festivals become festivals for all communities, they largely nurture modern ideas and culture. However, fundamentalists always want to occupy the arenas of these festivals more and more to spread their ideology, and strive  to make their character communal. It is necessary to be aware of this danger and maintain the initiative to make these festivals universal.


(9) Is it appropriate to participate in the activities of religious organizations and the social service institutions (health, education, etc.) they run?

Even if one is not concerned with religion, many people are generally involved in such social service rendered by religious institutions. In this case, it is necessary to participate while being vigilant about how non-sectarian and loyal to modern epistemology and science the religious institutions are, for carrying out these activities.


(10) What should be the role of a secular state in resisting religious fundamentalism?

A secular state is a state that maintains official neutrality in religious matters and does not support or oppose any particular religion. In such a state, the government treats all citizens equally regardless of their religious beliefs and ensures that religious institutions do not interfere in state affairs, and on the other hand, the state does not hinder the religious propaganda and activities of institutions. The problem lies in this last condition. Although this condition is accompanied by some legal restrictions by the standards of modern civilization, when it violates those provisions depends on the ideology of our rulers and the perception and reaction of the judiciary. And that is the loophole that fundamentalist forces exploit. They use this policy of secularism to consolidate their ground and finally take over the state. Then they completely abandon secularism and establish a fascist regime dominated by the powerful section of their own community. Therefore, secularism needs to be re-evaluated. Religious institutions' commitment to religious tolerance, as opposed to hegemonic religious values, should be one of the conditions for their accreditation. To that end, it is necessary to create an open environment for debate and discussion about their religious texts. It is necessary to draw a distinction between practicing religion and preaching religion. Freedom of practicing religion and freedom of preaching religion are not the same. The latter is much more in conflict with modernity, which is why it needs to be regulated. Again, when religious practices provoke discrimination regardless of race, religion, or gender in terms of modern values, it is necessary to keep a rein on them.


I will conclude this discussion by returning to the role of a religion in the debate between theism and atheism, and the conditions for its survival. Generally, the philosophy of theism is considered a mandatory prerequisite for religion. However, this was not always the case. Buddhism was initially non-theistic, though the belief in reincarnation existed, and in later periods, the Buddha almost attained a god-like status. In Hinduism, too, the non-theistic Charvaka philosophy coexisted for a long time.[10]  Over time, those views and paths have vanished. In today’s world, theism is indeed a prerequisite for all prevalent religions.

However, the survival of a religion does not depend on this belief in God. Religion survives through its social recognition; its rituals, customs, ceremonies, and festivals; all become part of our social life. For this reason, when a religion seeks to take root in a different country with a different culture, it must undergo changes to its core character and create a synthesis with the extant culture of that land—just as Arabian Islam transformed in Bengal through the hands of Sufi dervishes (saints).

In ancient and medieval times, the tradition of "the King’s religion becoming the religion of his subjects" was seen in various countries. In this manner, the Greek and Roman religions were rapidly replaced by Christianity across vast regions of Europe. Followers of those ancient religions are no longer found in the modern world. In Indonesia and Malaysia, subjects took turns adopting Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam along with their kings. The same was seen in countries like Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia; when Hindu kings became Buddhist, the subjects followed the suit. Similar events have occurred in the history of India as well. However, Islam entered India through the foreign invaders. When the ruler is a foreigner, converting the subjects is not easy to accomplish. Furthermore, indigenous Hindu kings were still powerful. There are very few examples of them changing their own religion. Consequently, for the sake of political stability, a type of compromise gradually developed between Islamic rulers and the kings and subjects of indigenous religions.[11] Thus, India still remains Hindu-majority.[12]

The reasons for the spread of Christianity and Islam among the tribes of Australia, Asia, Africa, and the Americas were somewhat different. In those relatively underdeveloped societies, it was easier to impose the religion of the rulers of an advanced society through a mix of soft and hard power. Yet even there, local cultures forced recognition from religious leaders.

In the modern secular world, the burden of a religion's survival depends less on the existence of theism and more on people's trust and interests in religious institutions. This is exactly what has happened in developed Western countries. Most people there today have turned religion from a place of faith into a mere formality. They celebrate Christmas in church, they marry there, and they celebrate religious festivals with fun, dance, and music; but beyond that, they give no special importance to religion. This does not mean they are all atheists. It is possible that many of them believe in God, but their sense of God lacks loyalty to institutionalized religion. This is probably the future of civilized, rational human beings.

To my religious friends who suffer from a moral crisis regarding a future godless society, I say only this: the real conflict is not between an atheist and a theist! The fortress of their institutional religious belief is collapsing today in the realm of modern knowledge and science. That is where their anger and fear lie! And that's why they have such hatred towards secularism. My only prayer to God, let  them be a little more humane and open-minded!

 

10/4/26

(Translated from a Bengali article written by the author with the help of Google Gemini.)



[1] A medieval Bengali poet in 14th Century, considered to be the first humanist in Bengal with his famous quote  “Sobar upor manush shotto tahar upor nai” (“Above all is Humanity, none else.”).

[2] Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (1486-1534): A Hindu saint and scholar in the late 15th and early 16th Century from Bengal founding the Vaishnav movement in worshiping God (Radha and Krishna) by singing devotional songs of love, and compassion, and by treating every human being equal disregarding division of caste, gender, and religion. Chaitanya’s Vaishnavism influenced Islamic rulers in Bengal leading to the development of a humanist culture and harmonious coexistence of Islam and Hinduism in Bengal for centuries. - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitanya_Mahaprabhu

[3] Lalan Fakir (1772-1890): A 19th century cultural icon, religious figure and the greatest exponent of Baul songs in Bengal. His philosophy places humanity above all rejecting all distinctions of caste, creed, gender and class; and takes stand against theological conflicts and racism. He wrote devotional songs influenced by Sufism and Vaishnavism acknowledging both Hindu and Islamic spiritual heritage.  - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lalon

[4] Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941): The first Nobel Laureate in Literature from Asia, a great humanist, educationist, and a Bengali cultural doyen and polymath, who influenced not only the literary and cultural movement of Bengal, but also that in the whole Indian subcontinent. - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabindranath_Tagore

[5] Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899 – 1976): A Bengali poet, lyricist and cultural icon, who is known as the ‘rebel poet’ for publishing anticolonial journal and voicing against the colonial rule. He opposed all forms of bigotry and fundamentalism, including religious, caste-based and gender-based. In 1942, he suffered from an unknown disease loosing his voice and memory, and  remained incapacitated till his death. He is honored as the National Poet of Bangladesh. - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazi_Nazrul_Islam

[6] I have no expectation of such analysis, practice, or reflection from dishonest "religious entrepreneurs."

[7] A realistic account of jihadi Islamic education and environment in the Deobandi madrasas of Afghan Mujahedeen in Pakistan can be found in the autobiographical writings of Maiwand Banayee, an Afghan author and current Irish citizen. He was educated in a madrasa in the Shamshatoo refugee colony in Pakistan and became a Taliban fighter before overcoming his fanaticism through exposure to modern education and moving to the West. — Maiwand Banayee, "Delusions of Paradise: Escape of a Taliban Fighter," Icon Books Ltd, 2025.

[8] Thanks to YouTube, the vitriol of religious scholars and their followers against modern science, the cultivation of blind faith through the fear and greed of Heaven and Hell, and the naked display of spreading hatred toward other religions and communities are now visible to all.

[9] The ‘Baul’ community of West Bengal and Bangladesh serves as a shining example of this kind of Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis and way of life.

[10] We find evidence of this view in the speech of Sage Jabali in the 108th Canto of the Ayodhya Kanda in the Valmiki Ramayana. Jabali attempts to persuade Rama to return to Ayodhya, arguing that a father's role in a child's birth is negligible and that offerings to the dead are meaningless. He suggests that scriptures on worship and sacrifice were created merely to subjugate people. — Valmiki Ramayana in Prose (in Bengali), Jyotibhushan Chaki (Ed.), 2005.

[11] A notable example of religious compromise is the seizure of power by Raja Ganesha in 15th-century Bengal. Ganesha, a Hindu landlord, took advantage of the weakness of the Ilyas Shahi dynasty. In 1415, he converted his 12-year-old son, Jadu, to Islam and placed him on the throne, ruling as the power behind the scenes throughout his life. This was a compromise with contemporary Turkish nobles and Sufis. Jadu took the name Jalaluddin Muhammad and ruled with great influence until 1432. — Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. P.55-63.  

[12] However, history is filled with examples of dominant religions establishing themselves through either conversion or expulsion of others. After the rise of Islam, it spread rapidly through the Middle East via the concept of Jihad. Jews were expelled from Palestine; most followers of Zoroastrianism in Persia converted, while a small portion took refuge in India. Buddhism vanished from vast regions of Central Asia, including Afghanistan. A reverse example is found in Southern Spain, where Christian kings defeated the 500-year-old Moorish Empire and expelled Muslims. Even in the modern era, Armenian Christians were expelled from Turkey in the 1910s, and the Holocaust under Hitler remains a dark chapter. The pain of families losing their homes during the partition of India remains with us, and the displacement of minority Hindus from West/East Pakistan due to communal violence has continued long after the partition.

Religion and Modernity: Part VI - Reverse Communalism

   

In our discussion on fundamentalism and communalism, we shall now address another type of manifestation of communalism. This communal attachment does not center directly on any religious belief or sentiment. Rather, for various reasons and objectives, individuals or political parties—without being connected to a given religious faith themselves—are seen to harbour both empathy and sympathy for and support the communal politics of a specific religion. Therefore, this is termed Reverse Communalism.[1] Political opportunism is intertwined with this, which is effectively a pseudonym for pseudo-secularism.

In our country, in particular, such tolerance and compromise toward Islamic fundamentalist organizations can be observed among leftist intellectuals and secular parties. We have seen how deeply pan-Islamic nationalism is embedded in Islamic fundamentalism; when the ethnic and nationalist aspirations merge with it, it becomes highly complex. Islamic political organizations had shrewdly exploited this. When the Muslim League put forward the demand for Pakistan in 1940, the then Communist Party of India (CPI) supported their demand, construing it as a struggle against British imperialism. They left the side of the Congress, who was  leading then the anti-colonial movement, and directed their party workers to work within the Muslim League. Later, after witnessing the role of the Muslim League in communal riots, they made course correction.[2]

This mindset is reflected in the present conflict between the state of Israel and Hamas in Palestine. Despite Hamas being an Islamic fundamentalist political organization, we see a wave of indiscriminate sympathy and support for their views and methods across the globe. We have not seen a formal protest of that magnitude even regarding the way they attacked a festival on October 7, 2023, killing innocent Israeli citizens and taking them hostage. We see a picture of the moral dilemma regarding this in the comments of the renowned writer Arundhati Roy against the inhumane destruction that Israel is carrying out in Gaza in response to the Hamas attack.[3]

“I am acutely aware that being the writer that I am, the non-Muslim that I am and the woman that I am, it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible for me to survive very long under the rule of Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Iranian regime. But that is not the point here. The point is to educate ourselves about the history and the circumstances under which they came to exist. The point is that right now they are fighting against an ongoing genocide. The point is to ask ourselves whether a liberal, secular fighting force can go up against a genocidal war machine. Because, when all the powers of the world are against them, who do they have to turn to but God? I am aware that Hezbollah and the Iranian regime have vocal detractors in their own countries, some who also languish in jails or have faced far worse outcomes. I am aware that some of their actions—the killing of civilians and the taking of hostages on October 7 by Hamas—constitute war crimes. However, there cannot be an equivalence between this and what Israel and the United States are doing in Gaza, in the West Bank and now in Lebanon. The root of all the violence, including the violence of October 7, is Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and its subjugation of the Palestinian people. History did not begin on October 7, 2023.”

In independent India, despite making their political stance against Hindutva clear, declared secular parties have, from time to time, allied with the Hindutva  centric organization RSS and its political wing. Even currently, despite not having a single-party majority the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) at the Centre could rule in an autocratic fashion and openly pursue their agenda of Hindutva, as they had no dearth of support and active cooperation of its coalition partners, many of whom once stood at the opposite pole of their communal politics and vouched for secularism. Similarly, in the past in the politics of votes and alliances, various anti-Hindutva secular parties, including the Left and Congress, have indulged Islamic fundamentalism. From time to time, they had meekly submitted or supported their fundamentalist demands, in the mask of secularism and commitment to communal harmony.[4] Their prime objectives were to win "electoral battles" and remain in power.

In this context, the analysis of the late renowned sociologist Dharma Kumar (1928-2001) regarding the perspective of India’s leftist intellectuals—specifically secular historians (whom we shall refer to as "progressives" in this discussion)—toward Hindutva and Islamic fundamentalism is noteworthy.[5]

According to her, several concepts or conclusions held by these historians regarding the nature of religious communalism in modern India are biased and lack historical evidences. On the contrary, it is more likely that objective evidences exist against them. However, these historians tend to avoid such facts and undermine the factors related to Islamic fundamentalism. As a result, there is a dearth of genuine research initiatives studying the social and communal lives of the Indian Middle Ages under Islamic rules. Let us briefly review some of these biased concepts and conclusions of these progressives as compiled by her.

 

Biased Historical Constructs

  • Pre-colonial harmony: They  hypothesise that before British rule, Hindus and Muslims lived in harmony in medieval society. It is argued that Western historians supporting the colonial rule, and Indian historians influenced by them, painted a false picture of communal conflict and tension in medieval Indian society—a picture now being used by current Hindutva proponents and historians of that ideology for communal politics.
  • Communalism in India, a colonial construction: They believe that the seeds of communalism in its modern form were sown during the colonial era. In fact, it is claimed that colonial rulers deliberately planted these seeds and that communalism is essentially a “colonial construction”.
  • The impact of modernity: The progressives consider that introduction of modernity in colonial era brought a massive shift in Hindu-Muslim relations because, for the first time, signs of conflict appeared in certain regions and among specific groups. This is attributed to various factors, such as the introduction of Western-style institutions and the rise of powerful socio-religious reform movements in Bengal, Punjab, and Maharashtra, which in turn triggered a revival of religious conservatism.
  • Majority vs. minority communalism: They consider that the biggest danger facing India today is Hindu communalism. Therefore, it is deemed necessary for Hindus to be secular to help minorities become secular, as only the majority community can provide a sense of security. It is further believed that majority communalism (i.e., Hindu communalism in India) inevitably leads to fascism, while minority communalism (primarily Islamic communalism in India) leads to separatism or separatist sentiments.

 

Contradictions and Observations

 

While highlighting the popular and current concepts upon which the above observations were based, Dharma Kumar drew our attention to certain contradictions, which refute them. These observations are highly relevant in judging the origin and character of communalism in the Indian subcontinent.

  • The Exit of Buddhism: Progressive historians usually have a biased narration on how Buddhism departed from the Indian subcontinent and Hinduism resurfaced with renewed vigour in Indian society. They view this return of Hinduism as a victory of social conservatism and reactionary forces. This is because, in popular conception, Buddhism is egalitarian, republican, and anti-caste / anti-Brahminical; thus, the fall of Buddhism is viewed as "bad". Hindutva writers also indirectly accept this, though they blame Muslims for the fall of Buddhism. Conversely, the left and secular camps argue that Brahmins destroyed Buddhism to maintain their vested interests. However, it is surprising that, despite this, process of transformation of a Buddhist majority populace to a Hindu majority, which covered a vast landscape of Indian subcontinent and spanned a long period of hundreds of years, there is no historical record of persistence violence and ruthless suppression targeting Buddhists by any Hindu royal power.[6]

Renowned historian D.D. Kosambi (1876-1947) proposed a different theory on this aspect.[7] He noted that in Buddhist statecraft, the universal rule of a Chakravartin king (like the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka) is considered the ideal. He argued that when post-Harsha India broke into smaller kingdoms and the system of local rule of feudal lords was established, it was no longer economically feasible for those small states to maintain large, expensive Buddhist monasteries and their numerous monks. In comparison, establishing religious order through Hindu temples and a smaller number of Brahmin priests was easier.

Another flaw in these theories is the neglect of the specific process through which Hinduism assimilated Buddhism. Furthermore, Buddhism’s influence brought many changes to Hinduism itself. Through a kind of synthesis, the Buddhism of the 9th and 10th centuries merged into the larger Hindu family—a fact that has not received sufficient attention from our historians.[8]

·       Two faces of Hinduism: Progressive historians distinguish between “Brahmanical Hinduism” and “Lokaayata (Folk / Popular) Hinduism. In their view, Brahmanical Hinduism is essentially the “bad” Hinduism, which is distinct from the common folk’s “good” Hinduism or “true Hinduism”.

 

The root of this argument lies in the customs of caste division and untouchability within Hindu society. However, focusing solely on the caste system to entirely vilify Brahmanical philosophy results in a one-sided judgment. This perspective tends to ignore the internal reforms and changes in ancient customs within Hinduism to adapt to modernity. It cannot be denied that devout Hindus, including Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi, long attacked untouchability on moral grounds, and this has gained theoretical acceptance across a large section of Hindu society. Even earlier in our discussion, we saw that Hindutva proponents have theoretically rejected casteism, although they do not reject Varnashrama, as they consider it to be a system of division of labour introduced in   ancient Vedic society with much more mobility among social segments.[9]

 

Currently, another form of opportunistic caste-based politics is being played against Brahmanism. Leftists, too, have taken refuge in this opportunism. This is yet another example of reverse communalism. Consequently, in the momentum of political opportunism, a coalition between the so-called Brahmanical Hindutva proponents and various political parties representing Dalit and Kurmi castes has become possible today.[10]

 

·       The majority against a minority: A common strategy of the progressives is to refer to Hindus merely as a “majority community”. In this way, communalism is reduced to a simple generalization of conflicts between "majority" and "minority" communities. They even include Buddhism and Jainism under the "minority" umbrella to reduce the size of the Hindu "majority" as much as possible. But the problem with this hodgepodge of division is placing the religions of the Indian subcontinent in the same "minority" basket as Abrahamic religions. As discussed earlier, these two categories of religions are characteristically quite different. One is very much dominant / hegemonic, while the other is pluralistic. Thus, they overlook the difference in the communal character of these two lineages.

 

·       Harmonious courtly life: There is a lack of historical documents and evidence regarding the daily lives of common people under various Muslim rulers. Drawing a conclusion of a harmonious atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis across the entire country from this limited data is an oversimplification. The writings of progressives often mention only the courtly life of these rulers—specifically, North Indian courtly life. It is true that under some rulers, a type of courtly culture developed in art, architecture, music, and literature through the synthesis of Hindu, Persian, and Saracenic styles. It is also true that under some rulers, many educated individuals who once studied Sanskrit began learning Persian instead. This brought a certain pan-Indian character to the life of the North Indian urban high society. However, this never spread across the whole of India; it was a very small portion of North Indian life.

 

Undoubtedly, this North Indian courtly culture can be accurately described as a composite culture, and its achievements in Indian architecture and music are glorious. But one cannot claim, simply by looking at the beauty of the Taj Mahal, that conflict between Muslims and Hindus was absent during its construction. These accounts offer no specific commentary on the pride of Islamic rule among Muslims, or the suppressed fear and distrust among Hindus. However, a glimpse of the distrust born of religious bias and fear of authority can be seen in the behaviour of Hindus after the end of Muslim rule. As one colonial-era historian remarked: "It is rarely acknowledged how much Hindu festivity came out into the open during the 19th century." [11] His comment hints at a potential communal tension. Delving into it may be painful, but however unpleasant the truth is, it needs to be understood in its true perspective.

 

·       Undermining Islamic theory of Jihad:   Regarding how Islam spread in India, the progressives tend to favour a specific narrative. They do not give weight to the Islamic theory of Jihad. On the other hand, Hindutva proponents claim that Islam spread in this subcontinent through force. Rather than directly rejecting this claim, progressives seek to present the violent expansion of any religion as a natural medieval or ancient process. Consequently, secular and various schools of Muslim historians responded by claiming that Hindus themselves were violent toward Buddhists. For instance, during a 1961 debate over school textbooks in Uttar Pradesh between Chief Minister Sampurnanand and A. J. Faridi, Faridi claimed that he had no objection to the narrative, and also to teaching in school history books about the destruction of Hindu temples by Muslim conquerors, provided the lessons would include how Hindu rulers destroyed Buddhist temples.[12] Along with this, some secularists hold the view that the flaws of Hinduism—specifically the inhumane treatment of lower castes by the upper castes—inspired a large number of the poor to embrace Islam.

 

Analytical and research-oriented studies on the spread of Islam in the Indian subcontinent are still insufficient. Among them, Richard M. Eaton, a Professor of History at the University of Arizona, published a highly informative research work on the spread of Islam in Bengal.[13] In it, he examined four prevalent theories of Islamization in India and attempted to outline the potential causes of Islamization. Let us briefly go through his findings and arguments.

 

The first, and the least credible theory is that Islam came through immigrant Muslims—meaning Islamization did not occur through the conversion of local inhabitants, but rather that Indian Muslims are descendants of immigrants from abroad. This naturally fails to explain the vast number of local people who embraced Islam.

 

The second theory characterizes Islam as a ‘Religion of the Sword’, suggesting that residents of the subcontinent were forced to embrace Islam under the threat of violence. However, the contradiction in this theory becomes apparent when one observes that the proportion of Muslims to Hindus in North Indian states is not sufficiently high, despite those regions being ruled for centuries by powerful Muslim rulers. Conversely, Islam spread most rapidly and in vast numbers in the frontier regions of East Bengal and West Punjab, where Islamic rule was relatively soft and accommodative to local customs.

 

According to the third theory, Islam spread in the subcontinent as a ‘Religion of Patronage’. This suggests that residents converted out of a desire for favours such as money, property, or power from Muslim rulers. But this could only satisfy a handful, and it does not explain the extensive Islamization of Bengal and Punjab given the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in those regions at the time.

 

The fourth is the theory supported by our "progressives": Islam as a religion of “social liberation”. Yet,  strong factual evidences for this have not been presented by them, at least regarding Bengal. Eaton has shown that "in Bengal, Muslim converts came primarily from indigenous groups who were only marginally acquainted with Brahmanical culture, and the same was true for various Jat groups in Punjab who eventually formed a large part of the Muslim community."[14]

 

However, the process of Islamization in this subcontinent cannot be limited to these four theories. Since the details of this process are more available for Bengal than other regions, Eaton presents a possible scenario based on those accounts. Citing evidence, Eaton shows that the mass Islamization of Bengali peasants only happened after the sixteenth century. This occurred during the Mughal era. Yet, the Mughals had no specific interest in proselytization. It happened through a slow process over centuries, beginning with the expansion of agriculture and the establishment of new settlements by clearing forests on the eastern frontier. Religious institutions played a crucial role in this colonization, and mosques and shrines (mazars) spread throughout the countryside of East Bengal. Due to the inherent tolerance of the local populace, they initially accepted Allah, Muhammad, and Muslim holy men as additions in the list of  to their worshipped deities and saints.

 

Eaton calls this first stage ‘Inclusion’. In the subsequent stage, these "identities" ‘merged’. Thus, 'Allah' was used synonymously with 'Niranjan.' In the final stage, ‘Displacement’ occurs, where Muslim rituals and codes displace others. While it is difficult to determine clear chronological divisions of these stages, the form of "Islam" present in modern Bengal—as a conservative, closed system defined by the Quran and Hadith—is primarily a product of the "purification" movements of the religious fundamentalist in nineteenth[15] and twentieth centuries.[16] Yet, for the rural Bengalis of the pre-modern era, the line of distinction between 'Islamic' and 'Hindu-Buddhist' customs was blurred and flexible.[17]

 

·       Colonial communalism: We have already discussed the role the colonial  British government played in the introduction of religious communalism into Indian nationalist politics.[18] However, while identifying the British era as the source of religious communalism, an important fact escapes our notice: it was the British who first adopted the policy of separating religion from the state in India.[19] Individual government officials might have assisted missionary activities, but it was not legal. On the contrary, the law was not to support any religion, and this was seen during the colonial era through the reduction of government subsidies for religious institutions and officials. Therefore, highlighting only the divisive role of colonial rulers in communal politics while obscuring its character of upholding secular principles applied universally in the administration is a form of bias.

 

Conversely, to prove the religious tolerance of the Mughal era, progressives often ignore the bias toward Islam and discriminatory behaviour toward non-Muslim populations during that period. One example is the imposition of the Jizya tax on non-Muslims. In this case, the indulgent argument of the progressives is that not all Mughal emperors imposed Jizya, and that special taxes on Hindus or the looting of temples were ‘motivated solely by a desire for revenue’.[20] We have also seen in the history of Sikhism, how Sikhs were persecuted by Mughals.[21]

 

·       Religious tolerance of rulers: Regarding the relationship between religion and the state, there is a difference in the political philosophies of medieval Hindu and Muslim rulers. Islamic texts clearly state that the function of the state is “to protect the religion of Islam and propagate its message”.[22] Although a Hindu king might consider other religions or sects inferior to his own, it can be said of Hindus that “the king was tasked with protecting all religions within his kingdom”. [23] The pace of conversion also depends on the state policy. Hindu and Muslim rulers had different policies toward subjects outside the ‘state  religion. In this context, historian Aziz Ahmed remarks that, generally, with some exceptions like Firoz Tughlaq, Muslim rulers did not provide state encouragement or use force for non-Muslims to embrace Islam. However, all Muslim rulers were extremely strict in punishing apostasy (quitting the religion). Only Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin of Kashmir and the Mughal Emperor Akbar were perhaps the two rulers who accepted equal rights for both Hindus and Muslims regarding conversion and apostasy. On the other hand, the attitude of Hindu rulers toward conversion and re-conversion was entirely different.[24]

 

                                                     ...

 

Dharma Kumar's sharp observations show how even the progressives get entangled in the trap of "reverse communalism" within a labyrinth of evidence-free arguments. This lack of an objective perspective among our leftist and secular historians in knowing and understanding medieval Indian social life, and their tendency to avoid or downplay natural questions arising from the differences  between Islam and Indian religions in their urge to refute Hindutva politics, actually add more confusion in the mind of an impartial and rational person. Their explanation is also inconsistent with the folk-cultural narratives of Hindu-Muslim harmony and conflicts in  Middle Ages. Thus, their credibility is at risk. Communal organizations of both Hindu and Muslim faiths are taking advantage of these confusions today. This is why it has become increasingly necessary to know, understand, and bring to light our history of social interaction among these religions with facts  and accounts. These would help us to judge the past, study the present scenario, and take our stand against the revival of religious fundamentalism and communalism in the modern world.

 

 

(Translated from a Bengali article written by the author with the help of Google Gemini.)

 

10/4/26

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Another type of communal expression is seen among intellectuals. Despite professing sympathy for secularism, atheism, etc., they are biased towards the religion of their  own family and community. Depending on the situation, it may also assume a  strong communal character. We identify this type of communalism as ‘latent communalism’. It is at the opposite pole of the reverse communalism. (Author)

[2] Irfan Habib, The Left and the National Movement : Social Scientist , May - Jun., 1998, Vol. 26, No. 5/6 (May - Jun., 1998), pp. 3-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517546

[3] Arundhati Roy: ‘No propaganda on Earth can hide the wound that is Palestine’,  Canadian Dimension on October 13, 2024.

https://mronline.org/2024/10/19/arundhati-roy-no-propaganda-on-earth-can-hide-the-wound-that-is-palestine/ , Posted Oct 19, 2024.

 

[4] Aditya Mukherjee, How Secular Parties Played Their Part in Rise of Communalism, 25th Feb, 2023, https://thewire.in/books/how-secular-parties-played-their-part-in-rise-of-communalism

[5] Dharma Kumar, Left Secularists and Communalism, Economic and Political Weekly, Jul. 9, 1994, Vol. 29, No. 28, pp. 1803-1809.

[6] On the other hand, extensive accounts of the destruction of Buddhist monasteries and temples during the Turkish invasion of Bengal and Bihar (then Magadha) in the 12th century are available from the writings of Muslim historians and Tibetan Buddhist monks. For example, the account of the destruction of Nalanda and Odantapuri Mahaviharas during the invasion of Bakhtiyar Khilji is available in the writings of the 13th century historian Minhajuddin Siraji in his Tabaqat-i-Nasiri. Similarly, the autobiographical writings of the contemporary Tibetan monk Dharmaswamin provide accounts of the destruction of Buddhist monasteries and temples by the Turkish invaders, and the torture and killing of Buddhist monks. In the atmosphere of fear of the Turkish invasion, many Buddhist scholars and monks fled to Nepal and Tibet at that time. It is mentioned in the writing of Dharmaswamin that even after this, Buddhist scholars in Nalanda resumed their studies and intellectual practices to a limited extent. They were newly united with the financial support of a Brahmin named Jayadeva from a wealthy commoner family. For this reason, Jayadeva was arrested by the Turkish soldiers and threatened with death. A local Hindu king also supported the resumption of  Buddhist Viharas. This account by Dharmaswamin also rejects the theory of the conflicts between Hinduism and Buddhism as the reason for the extinction of Buddhism in East and North India. -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nalanda_mahavihara#cite_note-109

[7] D D Kosambi, 'The Decline of Buddhism in India' (1956) in Exasperating Essays,  India Book Exchange, Calcutta, 1957; re- printed 1977.

[8] The play 'Agamdambar' written by Jayanta Bhatta, a Kashmiri Naiyayaka, in the 9th century, presents the controversies of contemporary Buddhism, Jainism, Tantra, and Vedic religions. The playwright, of course, presents these controversies to prove the superiority of Vedic religion and tries to show the arguments of different religions in a somewhat ironic way. But in the last chapter of the play, he ends the play with a plea for friendly coexistence and reconciliation of all these religions. This play shows the opposite picture of the theory of the extinction of Buddhism through violence. - 'Much Ado About Religion' A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Agamadambara, a Satirical Play by the ninth century Kashmiri philosopher Bhatta Jayanta - D.Phil, thesis, by Csaba Dezso, Balliol College, 15 January 2004.

[9] However, the futility of this claim in favour of Varnashrama is found in ancient Hindu scriptures. In a hymn of the Rigveda, a reference to Varnashrama clarifies varying social status among high and low castes by comparing them with different parts of a human body. There are also references in scriptures of being born into a high caste through good work (Karma).

[10] After the 2024 elections, the BJP formed a government at the Centre with the support of Nitish Kumar's JD(U) (representing the Kurmi community) and Chirag Paswan's LJP (son of late Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan). Without their support, the Hindutva-aligned BJP could not have formed the government.

[11] Asim Roy, Islamic Syncretist Tradition, 1937, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1983 p 25.

[12] Paul Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1974, p 222.

[13] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993.

[14] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, P-115.

[15] In the 1830s and 40s, the Faraizi Movement emerged under Shariatullah (and later Dudu Miyan), preaching against Islamic rituals influenced by local Hindu traditions and advocating for Islam as described in the Quran and Hadith. This movement became popular among Muslim peasants as it rose against the taxes and oppression of the British and Hindu landlords. A similar movement arose in Barasat in 1830-31 under Titu Mir. While Titu Mir's followers were suppressed, the Faraizis eventually accepted British rule and were tolerated. These movements consolidated the communal identity of Bengali Muslims, creating a distinction from Bengali Hindus. — Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-religious reform movements in British India, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

[16] The situation in post-July 2024 Bangladesh—where Baul, Sufi, and Marfati Muslims are being attacked during "Islamic purification" riots by the "Tauhidi" public with active state backing—is being viewed as a new stage of Islamization. While Islam spread in Bengal via Sufism prior to the 19th century, followed by the rise of Hanafis, the current stage sees the more conservative Salafism taking root. (Author)

[17] Richard Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. P.173.

[19] The British government was always conscious of maintaining this secular policy in the colonial education system, as formulated by Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839). - https://jmukhopadhyay.blogspot.com/2024/07/the-colonial-education-in-india.html

[20] Satish Chandra, Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1993.

[22] P J Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Paperback edition, Routledge, London, 1991.

[23] Heinrich von Stietencron, 'Hinduism, On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Noun" in Gunther D Sontheimer and Herman Kulke (eds), Hinduism Reconsidered, Manohar, Delhi, 1989, pp. 19-20.

[24] Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, pp 85-86.